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Matsigenka Corporeality, a Nonbiological 
Reality: On Notions of Consciousness and 
the Constitution of Identity
DAN ROSENGREN
Göteborg University
dan.rosengren@globalstudies.gu.se
DAUGHTER: It seems to me we have said these words before, somewhere else.
POET:  Then you can soon work out what reality is.
DAUGHTER:  Or dreaming!
POET:  Or poetry!
   —August Strindberg (A Dream Play, 1901)
	 In	the	ethnography	of	Amazon	peoples	during	the	last	thirty	years	or	
so,	their	conceptions	of	the	body	have	come	to	attract	much	interest.		One	
reason	for	this	increased	interest	is	that	Amazonian	notions	of	corporeality	
do	 not	 conform	 to	 what	 constitutes,	 from	 a	 Western	 or	 modernist	
perspective,	 conventional	 suppositions	 based	 on	 biological	 assumptions.	
Since	few,	if	any,	would	be	prepared	to	dismiss	the	different	Amazonian	
perspectives	 as	 produced	 by	 irrational	 world	 views,	 these	 conceptions	
have	come	to	challenge	the	conventional	anthropological	understandings	
of	 humanity.	 	 The	 richness	 of	 the	 ethnographic	 descriptions	 indicates	
moreover	 that	 the	 body	 and	 associated	 ideas	 about	 corporeality	 are	
something	that	the	peoples	indigenous	to	the	area	consider	to	be	central	
to	their	conception	of	the	world.		The	recent	ethnographic	attention	paid	
to	notions	regarding	the	body	means	that	there	is	now	extensive	material	
presenting	many	 and	 varying	 ideas	 and	perspectives.	 	One	 issue	 that	 is	
at	 the	core	of	much	of	 this	 interest	 is	 the	relationship	between	physical	
body	 and	 consciousness,	 as	 it	 has	 been	described	 and	 analyzed	by	 such	
authors	as	Århem	(1993),	Gray	(1996),	and,	above	all,	Viveiros	de	Castro	
in	his	truly	seminal	article	on	Amerindian	“perspectivism”	(1998).		Here	
I	want	to	explore	how	consciousness	and	corporeality	articulate	according	
to	Matsigenka	people	living	in	the	Urubamba	and	Manu	River	regions	in	
southeastern	Peru.		This	relates	to	an	overriding	theme	of	the	essays	in	this	
volume,	which	address	such	 issues	as	where	the	faculty	of	cognizance	 is	
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thought	to	be	located	and	how	this	localization	influences	the	perception	
and	 understanding	 of	 the	 world,	 as	 well	 as	 how	 one	 interacts	 with	 its	
various	denizens.		
TWO TENDENCIES
	 Allowing	for	a	certain	degree	of	generalization	and	simplification,	the	
various	perspectives	on	the	relationship	between	body	and	consciousness	
that	 are	 of	 relevance	 here	 can	 be	 subsumed	 and	 described	 in	 terms	 of	
two	 main	 tendencies.	 	The	 first	 tendency	 puts	 stress	 on	 the	 corporeal	
form.		To	the	adherents	of	this	tendency,	the	body	functions	as	a	molder	
of	 the	“bearer’s”	 subjectivity,	whose	point	of	view	will	 vary	according	 to	
corporeal	shape.		Different	classes	of	beings	are	disposed	to	perceive	the	
world	from	distinct	points	of	view	according	to	the	shape	of	their	bodies	
(Viveiros	de	Castro	1996:128;	1998:471).		Moreover,	all	kinds	of	beings	
conceive	of	 themselves	 in	human	shape,	and	alterity	 is	produced	by	 the	
perception	of	other	classes	of	beings	in	differently	shaped	physical	bodies.	
Consciousness	and	knowledge	are	thus	actualized	in	bodily	form,	which	
means	that	there	supposedly	exists	a	straightforward	and	uncomplicated	
correlation	between	the	body	and	the	perceived	subjectivity	of	“Self ”	and	
“Others”	(Vilaça	2005:450).		The	focus	on	corporeality	signifies	that	this	
tendency	stresses	the	uniformity	of	each	species	and,	hence,	studies	within	
this	tendency	are	concerned	primarily	with	interspecies	relations.		
	 This	approach	has	little	to	say	with	regard	to	intraspecific	variation	and	
individual	agency.		To	understand	how	people	see	and	act	in	their	world	
we	must	turn	to	the	second	tendency.		Here,	consciousness	is	emphasized	
and	seen	as	constituting	the	body	as	a	social	subject.	 	A	central	tenet	of	
this	tendency	is	that	each	being	is	constantly	formed	in	social	interaction	
in	which	elements	such	as	morals,	kinship,	and	affection	play	a	prominent	
role.	 	The	thinking	of	people	 is	shaped	by	them	being	social	and	moral	
beings	rather	than	because	of	their	particular	physical	form	(see	Overing	
1985a,	1988;	Gow	1991,	2000;	McCallum	1996;	Belaúnde	2000;	Londoño	
Sulkin	2005;	Santos-Granero	intra).		
The	 different	 foci	 assumed	 by	 these	 two	 tendencies	 result	
in	 the	 ascription	 of	 opposed	 epistemic	 models	 to	 the	 peoples	 of	 the	
region.	 	 Studies	 made	 in	 conformity	 with	 the	 first	 of	 the	 tendencies	
described	above	often	assume	 that	epistemic	uniformity	 is	 a	 foundation	
of	Amazonian	ontology.		In	agreement	with	such	a	postulation,	Viveiros	
de	Castro	suggests	that	Amerindians	conceive	of	a	“spiritual	unity	and	a	
corporeal	diversity”	(1998:470)	signifying	a	common	subjectivity	of	beings	
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in	a	multinatural	world.		In	contrast,	the	second	tendency	acknowledges	a	
“multiverse”	where	knowledge	is	socially	acquired	and	relative	to	particular	
situations.		Concurring	with	this	latter	perspective,	I	argue	that	subjectivity	
for	Matsigenka	people	emerges	in	the	social	settings	in	which	a	person	is	a	
part.		The	perspectivism	of	Matsigenka	people	and	their	understandings	of	
associated	notions	of	bodily	transformations	differ	from	the	views	presented	
by	Viveiros	de	Castro	(1998)	and	others,	in	that	bodies	are	considered	to	
be	of	an	eminently	social	nature,	and	from	which	it	follows	that	it	is	the	
noncorporeal	cognizant	self	(isure)	that	determines	outlook	and	identity.	
Since	aspects	of	 self	 are	 socially	 rather	 than	physically	 constituted,	 they	
take	precedence	over	the	body,	and	are,	as	a	result,	less	variable	than	the	
corporeal	form.		Given	similar	social	conditions,	the	person	remains	the	
same	 irrespective	 of	 physical	 shape	 and	 the	 physical	 body	 is	 in	 certain	
respects	merely	a	shell	that	contains	the	self.1		
	 The	Matsigenka	conception	of	self,	as	I	conceive	of	it	here,	admittedly	
has	 much	 in	 common	 with	 other	 concepts,	 for	 example,	 Viveiros	 de	
Castro’s	 (1998)	 “subjectivity”	 and	 Santos-Granero’s	 (intra)	 “vitality.”	
However,	in	contrast	to	these	concepts	that	primarily	refer	to	general	and	
abstract	 principles,	 “self ”	 refers	 to	 that	which	 is	 individually	 specific	 in	
what	Matsigenka	conceptualize	as	a	quality	of	 the	soul.	 	Every	animate	
being	has	a	soul	that	contains	aspects	of	both	vitality	and	subjectivity,	but	
each	soul	expresses	these	in	a	unique	manner.		The	individual	articulation	
of	 subjectivity	 and	 vitality	 is	 formed	 through	 the	 particular	 experiences	
and	influences	that	bearers	have	been	exposed	to	during	their	lives.		The	
condition	 in	 which	 the	 cognizant	 self	 is	 associated	 with	 a	 particular	
individual	means	that	it	is	linked	to	the	body	of	that	person.		It	is,	however,	
not	the	physical	shape	of	the	body	that	is	of	significance	in	this	context,	
but	rather	the	body’s	function	as	a	receptor	of	sensuous	perceptions	and	as	
a	means	to	transmit	and	implement	the	intentions	of	the	individual.		The	
importance	of	the	body	lies,	thus,	in	being	located	at	the	interface	between	
different	persons,	that	is,	in	its	social	nature.
	 As	a	rule,	Matsigenka	people	do	not	reflect	upon	the	epistemological	
presuppositions	that	form	part	of	how	they	conceive	of	themselves	and	the	
world	in	which	they	live.		With	the	exception	of	notions	regarding	the	soul	
as	object,	these	assumptions	constitute	to	most	Matsigenka	a	kind	of	tacit	
knowledge	that,	although	far	 from	monolithic	or	uniform,	 is	commonly	
taken	for	granted.		An	inkling	of	the	nature	of	these	assumptions	can	be	
elicited	from	the	way	that	my	compadre	Jordan	Koriki	solved	the	problem	of	
finding	an	adequate	expression	for	the	concept	of	nosure when	he	helped	me	
to	translate	a	song	about	manioc	beer.		In	the	song,	one	line	that	underscores	
his	problem	reads	oga osuretaganakena nosure,	which	he	eventually	rendered	
3
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“the	masato—she	makes	me	think	of—my	soul	and/or	my	thoughts	and/or	
my	true	self.”		Although	epistemological	presuppositions	of	this	kind	are	not	
elaborated	upon,	they	can	be	discerned	in,	for	instance,	rites	and	mythology.	
The	public	performance	of	such	cultural	registers	creates	conditions	for	the	
emergence	of	shared	understandings	that	form	a	conceptual	foundation,	
which	apparently	 is	 subscribed	 to	by	many	Matsigenka	and	 is	 therefore	
rarely	a	subject	for	reflection.
PREGNANCY AND BIRTH: 
THE EARLY FORMING OF THE SELF
	 In	various	life	cycle	rites,	assumptions	about	the	development	of	the	
individual	 self	 are	 clearly	 evident.	 	An	examination	of,	 for	 instance,	 the	
ritualized	 behavior	 linked	 to	 the	 first	 period	 of	 a	 child’s	 life,	 from	 the	
moment	of	conception	to	a	few	years	onwards,	allows	us	to	discern	some	
crucial	notions	regarding	the	formation	of	the	self	of	a	baby.		According	to	
Matsigenka	people,	an	animate	being	consists	basically	of	three	substances:	
blood/flesh,	 bone,	 and	 soul.	 	 In	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 fetus,	women	 are	
generally	assumed	to	contribute	to	the	blood/flesh	and	men	to	the	bone.	
People	generally	say	that	they	are	 ignorant	about	the	origin	of	the	soul,	
but	when	 pressed	 they	 usually	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 external	 to	 the	 human	
part	of	procreation.		However,	the	soul	needs	the	physical	body	in	order	
to	come	into	being,	although	it	is	subsequently	not	necessarily	tied	to	the	
flesh	 and	bone	 and	 can	 leave	 the	 body	 for	 shorter	 or	 longer	 periods	 of	
time	without	producing	detrimental	effects.		The	soul	detaches	itself	from	
the	physical	body	with	ease.		Detachment	occurs	regularly	throughout	the	
entire	lifespan	of	an	individual,	for	instance,	every	night	while	dreaming.
	 Matsigenka	 people	 do	 not	 practice	 the	 couvade,	 but	 a	 number	 of	
regulations	associated	with	giving	birth	affect	the	lives	of	the	members	of	
the	household	into	which	a	baby	is	born.		The	regulations	not	only	affect	
the	parents,	but	also	the	other	members	of	the	household	who	must	take	
care	 not	 to	 break	 any	 of	 the	 rules,	 lest	 the	 child	 be	 exposed	 to	 danger.	
The	regulations	are	principally	of	a	prohibitive	nature,	telling	what	must	
not	 be	 eaten	or	what	must	not	 be	done.	 	 In	 ethnographic	descriptions,	
such	prohibitions	against	eating	certain	animals	are	commonly	explained	
by	the	effects	that	the	meat	will	have	on	the	physical	shape	of	the	baby,	
often	with	dire	consequences	during	delivery	(cf.	Baer	1984:251;	Bennet	
1991:169;	Johnson	2003:114).		An	example	of	such	a	dietary	taboo	is	the	
prohibition	 for	 pregnant	 women	 to	 eat	 tapir	 meat,	 which	 is	 supposed	
to	give	the	fetus	a	head	so	big	that	 it	will	become	difficult	 for	the	baby	
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to	 leave	the	mother’s	womb	and,	thus,	put	both	at	peril.	 	However,	 it	 is	
not	the	tapir	meat	as	such	that	produces	these	effects,	because	tapir	meat	
only	affects	fetuses	and	nobody	else.		This	prohibition,	and	other	similar	
ones,	are	apparently	related	to	the	precariousness	of	individuals	involved	
in	the	particular	contexts	to	which	such	prohibitions	are	applied.		If	these	
kinds	of	regulations	are	not	honored	during	pregnancy	and	later,	then	the	
household	members	 run	the	risk	of	 loosing	their	control	and	monopoly	
over	the	formation	of	the	baby	during	the	upbringing	of	the	child	because	
other	beings	may	intervene	and	influence	the	baby’s	development.		If	the	
baby’s	soul2	is	captured	and	taken	away	by	a	nonhuman	being,	the	baby	will	
be	stillborn.		If	the	baby	maintains	its	soul,	this	nonhuman	influence	will	
produce	physical	and/or	mental	alterations.		Having	a	harelip	is	one	kind	
of	physical	characteristic	that	is	taken	as	an	indication	of	influences	from	a	
demon	(kamagari)	in	the	forming	of	the	newborn.		Formerly,	it	is	said,	such	
deformed	babies	were	killed	because	they	might	turn	dangerous,	since	the	
nonhuman	influence	was	not	just	physical	but	also	affected	the	personality	
of	the	newborn	who	was	part	human,	part	demon.		However,	nonhuman	
influences	do	not	necessarily	produce	physical	transformations.		They	may	
also	result	in	mental	alterations	affecting	the	form	and	expressions	of	the	
self	that	may	not	be	evident	until	later	in	the	child’s	development.3		
	 Matsigenka	people	 consider	 small	 children’s	 souls	 to	be	particularly	
volatile	 because	 souls	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 only	 loosely	 attached	 to	 the	
physical	 body	 during	 the	 first	 years.	 	What	 makes	 the	 early	 period	 of	
childhood	more	 precarious	 than	 other	 phases	 of	 life	 is	 that	 the	 soul	 at	
this	stage	has	not	yet	managed	to	develop	a	strong	social	attachment	to	
parents,	 to	 siblings,	or	 to	any	other	member	of	 the	community.	 	People	
thus	fear	that	the	soul	will	lack	the	motivation	for	returning	to	its	body.	
Moreover,	when	the	soul	is	outside	its	physical	shelter	it	is	not	accessible	
to	those	who	maintain	the	corporeal	form	of	this	world.		A	child’s	soul	that	
has	left	its	body	cannot	be	properly	protected	from	unwanted	influences.	
It	runs	the	risk	of	being	co-opted	by	other	beings.		An	important	motive	
for	many	of	the	treatments	to	which	babies	are	subjected	is	to	secure	the	
development	of	their	souls’	social	attachment	to	the	households	of	which	
they	 are	part.	 	For	 some	 time	after	birth,	babies	 are	given	hot,	 fragrant	
baths	 several	 times	 a	 day.	 	The	 purpose	 of	 these	 baths	 is	 not	 primarily	
hygienic.		The	fragrance	that	is	produced—by	flowers	and	aromatic	leaves	
that	have	soaked	in	the	water	for	a	while—serves	to	keep	away	malignant	
forces	 that	otherwise	may	 interrupt	 the	 socialization	process	within	 the	
household	and	influence	the	development	of	the	baby.4	 	Significantly,	at	
birth	not	only	the	newborn	baby	receives	these	baths.		All	members	of	the	
household	wash	in	such	water	because	they	all	form	part	of	the	immediate	
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setting	into	which	the	baby	is	arriving.		They	are	therefore	responsible	for	
influencing	its	development.
	 Since	 the	 social	 setting	 into	 which	 a	 baby	 is	 born	 is	 potentially	
composed	 of	 both	wanted	 and	 unwanted	 actors	 trying	 to	 influence	 the	
child’s	development,	the	motive	for	keeping	up	the	various	rules	associated	
with	 gestation	 and	 birth	 is	 first	 and	 foremost	 to	 allow	 for	 the	 child’s	
socialization	 into	 the	 human	 world	 without	 the	 intervention	 of	 other,	
nonhuman,	 contenders.	 	Due	 to	 the	 fear	 of	 unwelcome	 influences,	 the	
rules	associated	with	this	early	period	of	a	child’s	upbringing	are	intended	
primarily	 to	 regulate	 the	 relationship	 of	 the	 household	 members	 with	
nonhuman	beings,	in	order	to	keep	them	at	a	safe	distance	from	the	baby.	
Only	 indirectly	 do	 the	 rules	 concern	 the	 adults’	 immediate	 relations	 to	
the	baby.		The	behavioral	regulations	that	affect	the	household	members	
of	an	unborn	or	 recently	born	baby	are	effectively	a	complement	 to	 the	
“ordinary”	 upbringing	 of	 the	 child.	 	 Such	 regulations	 serve	 to	 inhibit	
unwanted	 influences	 on	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 self,	 and,	 in	 so	 doing,	 to	
facilitate	the	socialization	of	the	baby	into	its	proper	human	community.
PERSPECTIVISM AND SELFHOOD IN 
NARRATIVE DISCOURSE
	 Most	 Matsigenka	 myths	 involve	 some	 kind	 of	 social	 interaction	
between	 representatives	 of	 different	 species	 and,	 frequently,	 also	 some	
kind	of	bodily	transformation.		For	example,	myths	abound	with	instances	
of	human	women	having	sexual	 intercourse	with	nonhuman	beings	and	
later	giving	birth	to	babies	with	the	physical	form	of	their	partner.		The	
following	myth	about	a	man	and	his	encounter	with	peccaries,	recounted	
by	the	Dominican	Father	Secundino	García	(1936:86–87),5	makes	a	point	
of	 the	 actors’	 perception	 of	 each	 other,	 which	 usually	 is	 not	 as	 clearly	
accounted	for	as	it	is	here:
The	swidden	of	a	man	was	frequently	visited	by	peccaries	that	came	to	eat	
of	his	manioc.	 	As	 soon	 as	he	became	 aware	of	 their	 presence	he	 chased	
them	away.		One	day	when	he	went	hunting	in	the	forest	he	encountered	
the	peccaries.
	 “You	are	the	one	who	always	chases	us	when	we	come	to	eat	manioc,”	
they	said.
	 “No,	it	is	not	me,	it	is	another	man,”	he	responded,	thinking	that	if	he	
gave	himself	away	they	would	kill	him.
	 All	the	same	they	wanted	to	kill	him.		One	peccary	did,	however,	stop	
the	others	from	putting	an	end	to	the	man,	noting	that	it	would	be	better	to	
bring	him	along	and	to	use	him	as	their	servant.		And	so	they	decided.
6
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	 The	story	subsequently	tells	about	the	return	journey	to	the	home	of	
the	peccaries.		On	the	way	back,	the	party	comes	across	palms	and	fruit	
trees.		The	peccaries	force	the	man,	who	still	preserves	his	human	shape,	to	
climb	up	and	throw	down	coconuts	and	fruit	for	them	to	eat.		The	man	is	
not	happy.		On	one	occasion	he	tries	to	get	rid	of	the	pigs	by	remaining	in	
the	tree	that	he	has	climbed.		As	the	pigs	threaten	to	overturn	the	tree,	the	
man	is	obliged	to	climb	down	and	his	attempt	at	escape	fails.		Eventually,	
they	reach	their	destination	and	here	we	return	to	García’s	account	of	the	
story:
The	man	stayed	to	live	with	the	peccaries	and	with	time	he	himself	turned	
into	a	peccary.	 	One	day	the	peccaries	returned	to	eat	of	the	manioc	from	
the	man’s	swidden.		As	they	arrived,	a	young	man	saw	them	coming	and	he	
recognized	one	of	the	pigs	as	the	owner	of	the	swidden:
“That	must	be	my	fellow	countryman,”	the	young	man	said	to	himself	and	
stalked	his	neighbor	to	catch	him.	 	The	young	man	hid	himself	behind	a	
shrub	and	when	the	man	who	was	transformed	into	a	peccary	came	close,	
the	young	man	sprang	forth	and	caught	the	peccary	man.		When	the	young	
man	talked	to	him,	he	did	not	reply	because	he	did	not	speak	like	a	human	
being	any	longer.		The	young	man	brought	the	man	to	his	house	and	scalded	
him	in	hot	water.6		In	that	moment	he	started	to	speak	and	he	regained	his	
original	human	shape.
	 Central	 to	this	myth	is	that	the	physical	transformation	of	the	man	
into	 the	shape	of	a	peccary	 is	produced	only	after	 they	have	established	
convivial	 relations,	 that	 is,	when	 the	peccaries	and	 the	man	have	begun	
to	 treat	 each	other	 as	 similar	 in	 a	 social	 sense.	 	Becoming	 alike	 is,	 as	 a	
result,	an	effect	of	being	close	and	of	sharing	necessities	in	a	disinterested	
manner.		Transformation	is	here	produced	by	socialization	rather	than	by	
predation,	as	some	would	have	it,	and,	to	Matsigenka	people,	it	seems	as	if	
physiology	(or	at	least	important	aspects	thereof )	could	be	seen	in	terms	
of	sociology.7		As	a	corollary,	the	physical	transformation	experienced	by	
the	man	is	largely	ephemeral.		His	idiosyncratic	consciousness	remains	the	
same	while	he	physically	adapts	to	the	conditions	of	his	new	life.		When	
the	young	man	encounters	him	together	with	the	band	of	true	peccaries	he	
is	readily	identified	as	the	owner	of	the	swidden.		Thus,	even	though	the	
peccary	man	has	in	certain	respects	become	a	peccary,	he	simultaneously	
retains	his	individual	identity.		The	physical	body	serves,	primarily	in	regard	
to	his	individuality,	as	the	cloak	that	envelops	him.		In	effect,	this	myth	
suggests	that	the	personal	identity	and	conscious	self	are	not	as	unstable	as	
the	physical	form	may	be.		
7
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	 We	do	not	 learn	 from	 this	myth	how	 the	man	who	 is	 transformed	
into	a	peccary	conceives	of	himself.	 	However,	the	resilience	of	personal	
identity	is	corroborated	in	other	stories.		In	one	such	myth	a	man	is	left	to	
die	in	a	high	tree	by	his	wife	and	his	brother.8		Perched	high	up	on	a	branch	
and	unable	to	descend,	he	is	saved	by	the	crested	oropendola	(Psarocolius 
decumanus)	who	live	in	that	tree.		Although	the	man	is	transformed	into	a	
starling	and	lives	with	his	saviors	and	marries	a	female	of	theirs,	he	retains	
his	rancor	towards	his	former	wife	and	brother.		He	nourishes	a	wish	to	one	
day	avenge	himself.		Eventually	an	opportunity	to	retaliate	presents	itself.	
He	returns	into	human	shape	and	settles	the	score.		He	then	takes	on	the	
starling	shape	once	again	and	flies	away,	returning	to	his	new	family.		It	is	
to	be	noted	that	the	man	becomes	a	starling	only	in	regard	to	shape	since	
he	remains	the	same	person	with	the	same	manner	of	perceiving	the	social	
universe,	that	is,	he	retains	his	original	personal	identity.		The	assumption	
that	bodily	 form	does	not	affect	 the	social	agency,	nor	the	memory	and	
consciousness	of	the	subject,	appears	frequently	in	narratives	and	can	thus	
be	taken	to	be	a	commonly	held	idea	among	Matsigenka	people.
Figure 1.  Dario Mahuantiari, teller of myths, and his wife 
Mirian, Koribeni, Alto Urubamba
8
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THE SELF IN TRANSDIMENSIONAL RELATIONS9
	 This	 resilience	 of	 the	 self	 in	 Matsigenka	 thought	 is	 crucial	 in	
conceptions	 of	 the	 social	 and	 of	 sociability	 in	 everyday	 relations	 with	
neighbors,	as	well	as	in	transdimensional	relations	across	cosmic	borders.	
In	regard	to	transdimensional	relations	it	is,	for	instance,	fundamental	in	
Matsigenka	peoples’	conception	of	metempsychosis	(when	the	soul	of	one	
is	replaced	in	the	body	by	the	soul	of	another).	 	This	element	 is	central	
in	shamanic	practice,	where	 the	shaman’s	 soul	 is	 replaced	by	 that	of	his	
auxiliary	spirit	as	the	shaman	takes	off	to	places	that	are	encountered	in	
other	dimensions	(cf.	Baer	1984;	Rosengren	2002).		The	physical	body	is	
here	clearly	conceived	of	as	a	cover.		Matsigenka	people	themselves	talk	of	
it	as	imanchake isure	(“his	soul’s	clothing”).		The	body	is,	however,	not	just	
a	simple	wrapper.		It	is	indispensable	in	the	social setting because	it	provides	
the	spirit	with	the	physical	means	of	communication	with	those	humans	
who	have	not	 crossed	 the	boundaries	between	 the	different	dimensions	
of	the	universe.		Accordingly,	the	body	is	instrumental	in	this	context	as	a	
social	and	communicative	tool.
	 The	importance	of	the	body	as	a	means	of	communication	is	related	
to	conditions	of	comprehensibility,	which	require	that	verbally	interacting	
parties	 must	 be	 located	 in	 the	 same	 dimension	 of	 reality	 in	 order	 to	
understand	 each	 other,	 since	 each	 mode	 of	 verbal	 communication	 is	
exclusive	to	a	particular	dimension.		The	grunts,	chirps,	hisses,	and	roars	of	
animals	are	considered	by	Matsigenka	people	to	be	linguistic	expressions	
that	ordinarily	are	incomprehensible	to	humans	but	perfectly	clear	to	the	
pigs,	birds,	and	snakes	that	produce	these	various	forms	of	speech.		For	a	
human	 to	understand	nonhuman	 speech	 it	 is	necessary	 to	 cross	over	 to	
other	dimensions	of	reality.		It	is	perhaps	significant	that,	in	Matsigenka	
myths,	animals	are	never	reported	to	produce	anything	but	speech.10		Thus,	
when	the	peccary	man	is	rescued,	he	 is	at	first	unable	to	speak	with	his	
savior	since	the	two	are	found	in	different	dimensions	and	communicate	
according	to	different	modalities	of	speech.		It	is	only	when	the	peccary	
man	is	made	to	return	to	the	human	dimension	through	the	scalding	hot	
bath	that	he	is	able	to	speak	as	a	human	and	make	himself	understood	by	
fellow	humans.		
	 The	 man’s	 ability	 to	 speak	 with	 the	 peccaries	 when	 he	 initially	
encountered	 them	 in	 the	 forest	 is,	 in	 effect,	 a	 sign	 that	 he	 has	 crossed	
into	 a	dimension	 that	 is	 ordinarily	not	 occupied	by	human	beings.	 	As	
long	as	this	man	has	not	developed	closer	relations	with	the	peccaries,	his	
aptitude	 to	 speak	with	 them	does	not	affect	his	physical	 shape.	 	To	 the	
contrary,	it	is	the	maintenance	of	his	human	body	that	provides	the	pigs	
9
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with	a	servant.		Hence,	bodily	form	does	not	determine	consciousness	to	
Matsigenka	people.		Rather,	it	is	the	other	way	round.		
	 Movements	between	cosmic	dimensions	are	usually	facilitated	by	the	
use	of	psychoactive	drugs	 such	as	ayahuasca,	datura,	and	 tobacco.	 	Such	
transdimensional	movements	 also	 take	 place	when	 dreaming	 and	when	
the	 body	 is	 unconscious.	 	 Furthermore,	 on	 certain	 occasions	 that	 often	
(though	not	always)	seem	to	be	associated	with	some	kind	of	crisis,	 the	
movement	can	spontaneously	 take	place	without	any	of	 these	measures.	
Cosmic	 journeys	 are,	 however,	 commonly	 undertaken	 with	 the	 express	
purpose	of	meeting	with	certain	spirit	persons	(saangarite)	who	normally	
do	not	appear	in	the	human	dimension.		When	traveling	in	this	way,	the	
soul	 detaches	 itself	 from	 the	 physical	 body,	 although	 it	 is	 not	 bodiless,	
because	the	soul	has	a	body	of	its	own.		The	spirit	body11	is	similar	to	the	
corporeal	body.		It	has	the	same	instrumental	functions	when	manifest	in	
nonhuman	dimensions,	which	is	what	enables	the	soul	to	act.		In	effect,	the	
spirit	body	is	essential	for	humans	as	it	permits	them	to	communicate	in	
a	comprehensible	fashion	with	these	nonhuman	beings	and	it	provides	an	
alternative	means	to	the	metempsychosis	that	is	practiced	by	spirits	when	
they	visit	the	human	dimension.		
	 Obviously	 then,	 the	 physical	 body	 is	 not	merely	 a	 dress,	 and	 such	
a	 characterization	must	not	be	 taken	as	 anything	but	 a	metaphor.	 	The	
body	is,	in	this	context,	more	like	the	blind	person’s	stick	through	which	
he	 or	 she	 experiences	 the	 world.	 	The	 body	 is,	 thus,	 clearly	 sentient.12	
The	 sensuousness	 implied	 in	 the	 soul’s	 spirit	 body	 is	 conceived	 of	 as	 a	
prerequisite	 for	 its	 sociability13	 in	 this,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 other,	 dimensions.	
Most	 importantly,	 the	 body	 provides	 the	 means	 for	 speaking	 in	 a	
comprehensible	way.	 	Accordingly,	 the	 physical	 body	 is	 conceived	 of	 as	
a	necessary	 requirement	 for	being	able	 to	communicate.	 	However,	 it	 is	
not	sufficient	just	to	have	a	body	to	enable	a	meaningful	verbal	exchange.	
There	 is	 also	 a	 requirement	 that	 the	 interlocutors’	 conscious	 selves	 are	
positioned	 in	 the	 same	 dimension	 of	 reality.	 	The	 localization	 of	 one’s	
conscious	self	in	a	particular	dimension	of	reality	is	manifested	primarily	
in	the	capacity	to	communicate	and	to	socialize	with	those	other	conscious	
selves	who	simultaneously	are	 in	 that	dimension.	 	To	be	 situated	 in	 the	
same	dimension	as	other	beings	does	not,	however,	necessarily	signify	the	
sharing	of	 the	 same	point	of	 view,	 since	one’s	 self	 remains	basically	 the	
same	irrespective	of	the	dimension	in	which	one	is	located.		
	 When	the	“peccary	man”	 in	the	myth	spoke	with	the	peccaries	 that	
he	encountered	in	the	forest,	he	had	crossed	into	another	dimension.		The	
physical	transformation	that	he	eventually	undergoes	can	thus	be	said	to	be	
initiated	with	his	capacity	to	socialize	with	the	peccaries.		But,	because	of	
10
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the	agonistic	situation,	he	does	not	transform	physically	at	this	stage.		This	
occurs	only	later	when	the	man	and	the	peccaries	have	established	a	relation	
of	mutual	friendship.		Frequently,	physical	transformation	in	Matsigenka	
narratives	seems,	as	in	this	myth,	to	require	the	previous	establishment	of	
close	relations,	or	at	least,	by	explicit	intentions,	the	establishment	of	such	
relations.	14		Therefore,	the	change	of	dimension	affects	first	the	ability to	
socialize	and	then	subsequently	(though	not	necessarily)	the	corporeal	form	
that	is	affected	only	as	a	consequence	of	convivial	intentions.		The	analysis	
of	Matsigenka	narratives	seems	to	suggest	that	the	primacy	ascribed	to	the	
sociable	faculty	for	producing	corporeal	transformations	follows	from	the	
conception	of	the	process	as	voluntary	and	as	produced	on	the	initiative	of	
the	one	undergoing	the	changes	who,	hence,	is	not	being	transformed	but	
rather	transforms.
	 The	disconnectedness	between	corporeal	 form	and	consciousness	 in	
Matsigenka	thought	is	readily	apparent	in	relation	to	the	kinds	of	being	
that	 are	 classified	 as	 tsori	 (signifying	 that	 they	 look	 like,	 but	 still	 are	
different	from,	human	beings).15		In	the	eyes	of	Matsigenka	people,	all	non-
Amazonian	peoples	are	in	this	sense	tsori.		They	only	appear	to	be	human	
in	regard	to	their	physical	appearance	and	manners.		The	similarity	is	only	
illusory,	however,	since	tsori	are	beings	created	by	the	god	Kentibákori	and	
who	therefore	lack	certain	crucial	qualities	that	are	characteristic	of	“true”	
humans.		In	turn,	true	humans	were	created	by	the	god	Tasorintsi.		Among	
Matsigenka	people,	 as	 in	many	parts	 of	 the	Amazon,	humanity	 is	 seen	
principally	 as	 a	moral	 condition	 (cf.	Gow	1991;	Londoño	Sulkin	2005,	
intra;	Overing	1989,	1999;	Rosengren	2003a;	Santos-Granero	1991).		In	
contrast	to	true	humans,	tsori	are	distinguished	by	their	basically	unreliable	
and	 untrustworthy	 nature.	 	 In	 relation	 to	 such	 moral	 characteristics,	
customs	like	dress	and	food	habits	serve	as	mere	diacritical	signs.		
	 A	similar	kind	of	distinction	as	that	between	“true”	humans	and	tsori 
is	made	between	certain	classes	of	animals	and	classes	of	demons	that	have	
similar	appearances.	 	To	mark	 this	difference	 the	suffix	  niro	 is	added	 to	
the	denomination	of	the	“true”	being.	 	The	spider	monkey,	for	 instance,	
is	in	Matsigenka	called	osheto	while	the	physically	similar	demon	is	called	
oshetoniro.		The	anteater	is	shiani,	while	the	demon	double	is	shianiniro,	et	
cetera.		Under	certain	circumstances	humans	may	be	turned	into	a	“niro-
kind”	of	demon	at	death.		Sorcerers	are	said	always	to	change	into	this	kind	
of	demon,	usually	of	the	tapir	(kemariniro)	or	the	white	collared	peccary	
(shintoriniro)	kind.		Likewise,	pregnant	women	who	die	before	they	manage	
to	give	birth,	and	the	fetuses	they	carry,	are	turned	into	shintoriniro.		In	the	
first	 case	 it	 can	be	assumed	 that	 the	new	appearance	of	 the	 sorcerers	 is	
due	to	their	intimate	relations	with	demons,	while	in	the	latter	case	it	is	
11
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demons	 that	provoke	 the	death	of	 the	women	and	 the	unborn	children	
they	carry.		These	cases	do	not,	however,	deal	with	bodily	transformations	
in	the	sense	discussed	here,	since	it	 is	the	death	spirit	(kamatsiri)	of	the	
deceased	who	is	clothed	in	a	new	body,	while	the	old,	human	one,	is	buried	
and	left	to	decompose.
	 The	employment	of	the	linguistic	qualifiers	tsori and	niro	demonstrate	
that	 the	 similarity	 indicated	 between	 the	 beings	 in	 question	 is	 only	
superficial.	 	 However,	 at	 times	 it	 may	 be	 difficult	 for	 an	 inattentive	
person	 to	 distinguish	 between	 such	 similar,	 but	 different,	 beings.	 	This	
indistinctiveness	 is	 something	 that	 occasionally	 is	 taken	 advantage	 of	
by	 those	 demons	 that	 share	 physical	 appearance	 with	 “true”	 humans	
or	animals.	 	The	similarity	can	be	seen	as	a	kind	of	mimesis	that	 is	not	
defensive,	as	apparently	it	often	is	in	the	animal	world,	but	offensive,	as	it	
is	used	to	prey	on	credulous	and	unsuspecting	individuals.		As	a	result,	this	
kind	of	demon	attack	is	described	as	gasuretagantsi,	a	concept	that	Shepard	
(2002:207)	 renders	as	“to	have	one’s	 soul	 snatched,”	but	which	also	can	
be	translated	as	“to	have	one’s	soul	raped	or	married	away.”16		If	anyone	is	
led	to	consort	with	a	being	whose	true	nature	is	not	the	one	it	seems	to	
be,	the	unwary	person	may	lose	his	or	her	soul,	which	produces	the	slow	
pining	away	of	the	physical	body	and	eventual	death.	 	To	prevent	being	
duped	 in	 this	way,	Matsigenka	 are	 usually	 suspicious	 towards	 strangers	
whom	they	come	upon	in	the	forest	where	demons	roam.		Therefore,	when	
venturing	into	the	forest,	people	make	preparations	both	to	avoid	being	
fooled	by	demons	that	look	human,	as	well	as	to	forestall	being	mistaken	
for	one.		Various	kinds	of	medicine	are	brought	to	elude	being	approached	
by	demons.	 	To	prevent	being	mistaken	for	a	demon	a	facial	painting	is	
applied,	since	demons	are	supposed	never	to	paint	themselves.		By	applying	
face	paint,	the	bodily	surface	is	thus	manipulated	to	mark	both	a	difference	
of	identity	and	the	absence	of	foul	intents.		The	smell	of	the	annatto	(Bixa 
orellana)	used	to	produce	the	dye	employed	is,	moreover,	obnoxious	to	the	
demons.	 	The	paint	 therefore	 also	 serves	 as	 a	demon	 repellent.	 	At	 the	
same	time,	the	odor	of	annatto	paint	is	appreciated	by	the	saangarite	spirits	
whom	Matsigenka	usually	try	to	attract	as	a	means	of	defense	in	dangerous	
situations,	which	further	enhances	the	protective	function	of	the	dye.
	 Matsigenka	 comprehension	 of	 the	 world	 is	 apparently	 a	 complex	
intellectual	and	sensual	procedure.	 	In	a	critical	appreciation	of	Viveiros	
de	 Castro’s	 (1998)	 account	 of	 Amazonian	 perspectivism,	 Santos-
Granero	 (intra)	 addresses	 the	 insufficiency	 of	 reducing	 the	 mode	 of	
perceiving	 different	 kinds	 of	 being	 to	 sight	 alone.	 	On	 the	 basis	 of	 his	
analysis	 of	Yanesha	 peoples’	 conceptions,	 Santos-Granero	 demonstrates	
the	 importance	 of	 hearing.	 	 Various	 protective	 measures	 employed	 by	
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Matsigenka	people	in	their	relations	with	members	of	other	dimensions	
also	show	the	importance	of	the	olfactory	sense.17		For	Matsigenka	people,	
odors	and	smelling	are	recurrent	topics	in	their	discourse	on	interspecies	
relations.		The	use	of	different	fragrant	substances	in	everyday	life	(bathing	
in	fragrant	water	and	the	use	of	annatto	paint	has	already	been	mentioned)	
is	often	associated	with	their	relations	to	nonhuman	beings.		To	Matsigenka	
people,	smelling	is,	in	this	context,	not	only	a	contingent	effect	of	certain	
substances,	it	is	also	employed	as	a	communicative	means	in	combination	
with	other	means	of	exchanging	information.
	 The	physical	similarity	of	those	beings	that	are	described	as	tsori	and	
niro	 to	other	classes	of	beings	 is	clearly	not	assumed	to	signify	 that	 the	
various	kinds	of	beings	share	a	similar	perspective	on	the	world.		On	the	
contrary,	the	distinctive	classes	of	beings	are	thought	to	perceive	of	both	
the	physical	and	the	social	environment	in	their	own	particular	ways.		The	
respective	outlooks	of	the	classes	of	 tsori and	niro	beings	and	those	that	
they	 look	 like	 are	 therefore	not	determined	by	 their	 common	corporeal	
form.		The	significant	differences	between	these	categories	of	being	have	
evidently	 nothing	 to	 do	with	 physiology.	 	The	 different	 points	 of	 view	
become	evident	when	variances	in	modes	of	behavior	are	considered.		The	
various	modalities	of	 conceiving	 the	world	are	produced	by	 the	distinct	
formative	processes	that	they	undergo	as	individuals	belonging	to	different	
classes	of	being.		Hence,	it	is	sociology	rather	than	physiology	that	is	again	
fundamental	in	the	shaping	of	the	different	identities	of	the	various	classes	
of	being.		
BEING, SOUL, AND SELF
	 The	distinction	that	Matsigenka	people	make	between	a	“true”	being	
and	one	that	only	has	the	appearance	of	such,	reveals	how	both	being	in,	and	
knowing	of,	the	world	are	conceived.		It	is	clear	that	physical	similarity	does	
not	generate	a	particular	kind	of	disposition	that	automatically	produces	a	
similar	perspective	on	the	world.		Outlook	and	identity	are,	on	the	contrary,	
related	to	the	self	and	its	conscious	agency	that	is	formed	throughout	the	
life	of	a	person.	 	To	Matsigenka	people,	 the	 idiosyncratic	consciousness	
constitutes	an	 important	aspect	of	what	corresponds	to	their	concept	of	
isure	(“soul”).		Among	ethnographers	working	among	Matsigenka	people	
(as	well	as	among	the	neighboring	Asháninka)	the	concept	of	isure is	often	
considered	 to	 be	 rather	 peculiar	 (cf.	 Weiss	 1975:428;	 Baer	 1984:127)	
since,	with	the	meaning	of	“soul,”	it	exists	only	in	the	possessive	form.		In	
Matsigenka,	nouns	commonly	have	both	a	possessive	and	a	nonpossessive	
13
Matsigenka Corporeality, a Nonbiological Reality: On Notions of C
Published by Digital Commons @ Trinity, 2006
94         Dan Rosengren
form.		The	possessive	is	usually	generated	by	adding	a	prefix	to	the	word	
stem	indicating	personal	possessive	such	as,	for	example,	i-sure	(“his	soul”)	
or	no-sure	(“my	soul”)	et	cetera.		The	nonpossessive	is	generated	by	adding	
the	 suffix	 tsi	 to	 the	 stem,	 so	 that	 in	 this	 case	 it	 becomes	 suretsi.	 	What	
makes	the	word	peculiar	in	the	minds	of	these	ethnographers	is	that	suretsi	
does	not	mean	“soul”	but	“ghost.”		The	kind	of	being	that	is	described	here	
as	a	“ghost”	differs	from	the	conventional	European	notion	of	a	“ghost”	in	
that	it	is	not	the	soul	of	a	deceased	person	who	haunts	the	living.18		On	the	
contrary,	Matsigenka	people	consider	this	“ghost”	to	be	a	being	in	its	own	
right,	although	a	rather	odd	one.		The	peculiarity	of	the	suretsi	is	in	its	social	
indeterminacy	that	is	inherent	in	the	nonpossessive	form.		These	beings	
are,	consequently,	characterized	by	unboundedness	and	anonymity.		They	
lack	not	only	tangible	bodies	but	also,	and	primarily,	the	social	connections	
through	which	they	are	made	into	individual	selves	(Rosengren	2002:93).	
The	 isure	differs	 from	the	 suretsi	 since	 it	has	gone	 through	a	process	of	
formation	 that	 contains	 the	 complexity	 of	 a	 corresponding	 concept	 in	
Latin	 languages	 (e.g.,	 formación	 or	 formação),	 which	 includes	 shaping,	
structuralization,	and	education	in	which	the	soul	gains	its	individuality.19	
	 When	Matsigenka	are	asked	to	explain	the	significance	of	the	concept	
isure,	answers	are	usually	vague,	but	at	the	same	time	they	indicate	a	complex	
fusion	of	various	ideas.		Obviously,	isure	is	not	a	concept	that	Matsigenka	
find	 easy	 to	 define.	 	When	 asked	 to	 clarify	 it,	 people	 commonly	 give	
various	alternative	interpretations,	as	did	my	compadre	Jordan	Koriki	when	
he	translated	the	manioc	song	referred	to	above.		Most	frequently	people	
mention	both	“that	which	I	 really	am”	and	“that	which	I	am	thinking.”	
Such	attempts	to	explain	the	concept	suggest	that	Matsigenka	do	not	think	
of	the	individual	primarily	in	a	physical	sense,	but	more	as	the	outcome	
of	the	complex	combination	of	socialization,	experience,	and	knowledge.	
Evidently,	isure	is	also	closely	associated	with	the	particular	understanding	
of	the	world	of	the	individual.20		This	also	means	that	the	self	of	a	human	is	
principally	formed	in	human	social	contexts,	while	the	self	of	a	tsori	being	
is	formed	in	a	tsori	social	context.		The	conception	of	isure	is	thus	close	to	
what	we	could	describe	as	consciousness	and	cognizance,	or	rationality,	and,	
at	the	same	time,	the	vital	principle	without	which	living	is	impossible.		
	 The	 vitality	 that	 inheres	 in	 isure	 is	 prominently	 featured	 in	 the	
following	biographical	story,21	told	to	me	as	I	was	inquiring	about	shamans	
and	sorcerers.	 	An	evil	man,	whom	the	narrator	assumes	to	have	been	a	
sorcerer	(machikanari),	had	been	killing	many	people	and	he	was	greatly	
feared	by	those	who	lived	in	his	neighborhood.		He	was	captured	eventually	
by	Kashiriari	Maeni,	 a	mighty	 shaman	 (seripigari),	 living	 in	 the	 region	
of	the	Alto	Picha	River	in	the	Lower	Urubamba	area.		Kashiriari	Maeni	
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brought	the	evil	man	home	where	he	forced	him	to	kneel	down	and	then	
he	blew—Sho!—on	the	top	of	the	man’s	head,	that	is,	on	the	fontanel	that	
is	 supposed	 to	be	 the	principal	 gate	 through	which	 the	 soul	 leaves	 and	
enters	the	body.		Kashiriari	Maeni	then	pulled	out	the	man’s	isure from	his	
head.		(The	narrator	clenched	one	of	his	hands	and	put	it	on	the	open	palm	
of	the	other,	and	then	he	lifted	the	closed	fist	in	a	movement	as	if	he	was	
pulling	upwards.)	 	The	evil	man	immediately	 fell	 lifeless	 to	the	ground,	
but	Kashiriari	Maeni	 lifted	 him	 up	 and	 poured	 back	 some	 of	 his	 isure	
through	the	head,	whereby	the	man	regained	his	consciousness.		However,	
the	man	was	not	his	old	self	anymore.		He	could	not	speak	properly	and	
he	staggered	around	without	much	control.		(The	narrator	illustrated	the	
condition	 of	 the	 evil	man	 by	walking	 around	 as	 if	 he	was	 dead	 drunk,	
making	silly	faces,	and	twaddling	nonsensically	to	the	great	amusement	of	
the	audience.)		He	was	also	very	weak	and,	as	night	fell,	he	died.
	 This	 brief	 story	 is	 interesting	 since	 it	 clearly	 depicts	 the	 soul	 as	
something	concrete	and	tangible,	which	suggests	that	it	is	thought	of	as	
having	a	specific	place	within	the	body.		The	association	between	thoughts	
and	 the	 heart—common	 in	 many	 parts	 of	 the	 Amazon	 (cf.	 Belaúnde,	
intra)—is	also	made	by	Matsigenka	people.	 	The	central	position	given	
to	 this	muscle	 can	be	 elicited	 linguistically	 since	 the	 same	 root,	niga,	 is	
employed	to	form	the	verb	“to	be	in	the	middle”	(niga-nki),	and	for	“heart”	
(nigá-kintsi),	 the	 literal	meaning	of	which	 can	be	 rendered	“that	which	
is	 in	the	middle.”	 	However,	the	heart	 is	not	only	conceived	of	as	being	
located	in	the	middle	of	the	body,	it	also	constitutes	the	core	of	the	body	
in	a	more	symbolic	sense	that	refers	to	its	association	with	the	soul.22		The	
fact	that	the	core	of	a	tree	is	referred	to	as	osure	(cf.	Shepard	1999:90)	can	
probably	be	taken	as	an	indication	of	how	Matsigenka	people	conceive	of	
where	the	soul	is	situated	in	the	body.
	 As	noted	above,	the	soul	manifests	itself	in	a	more	substantial	way	in	
other	dimensions	such	as	those	visited	during	cosmic	journeys	and	while	
dreaming,	or	when	it	appears	in	bodily	form,	that	is,	in	what	I	above	have	
called	the	“spirit	body.”		The	concrete	character	of	the	soul	signifies,	among	
other	things,	that	it	can	be	divided	in	the	way	that	the	powerful	Kashiriari	
Maeni	(who	as	shaman	was	thoroughly	experienced	in	transdimensional	
matters)	treated	the	evil	man’s	soul.	 	More	importantly,	this	underscores	
that	the	soul	is	not	a	disposition	or	a	perspective,	but	a	thing	that	can	be	
handled	and	shaped	in	accordance	with	explicit	intentions.		This	plasticity	
of	the	soul	lies	behind	what	the	Matsigenka	conceive	to	be	the	unique	self	
of	every	individual.
15
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CONCLUSION
	 In	a	sense,	the	self,	as	discussed	here,	may	seem	to	be	more	or	less	what	
Viveiros	de	Castro	(1998)	speaks	of	in	terms	of	the	“subjectivity”	common	
to	all	beings.		An	outcome	of	this	perspective	is	that	both	individual	identity	
and	modes	of	knowing	of	and	relating	to	the	world	become	functions	of	
corporeal	shape.		In	contrast	to	the	preeminence	rendered	to	corporeality	
for	 forming	 the	disposition	 of	 subjectivities	 to	 perceive	 of	 the	world	 in	
a	 specific	 manner,	 the	 ethnography	 presented	 here	 demonstrates	 that	
bodily	form	to	Matsigenka	people	is	not	coterminous	with	consciousness.	
Although	they	are	parts	of	the	self,	both	body	and	soul	are	seen	as	distinct.	
Consciousness,	as	understood	by	Matsigenka	people,	is	nothing	that	can	
be	reduced	to	physiology.		
	 The	idea	that	the	physical	aspect	of	self	is	the	wrapping	of	the	soul	(or	
spiritual	aspect	of	self )	is	widespread	in	the	Amazon.		This	notion	of	the	
corporeal	body	as	an	envelope	is	commonly	linked	to	a	conception	of	the	
nonphysical	aspect	of	self	as	the	location	of	both	consciousness	and	self-
awareness.		Thus,	although	the	body	incorporates	various	sensuous	faculties,	
it	is	through	the	cognizance	of	the	soul	that	individual	consciousness	of	the	
world	is	formed	and	sensory	experiences	are	made	intelligible	and	possible	
to	act	upon.		Santos-Granero’s	(intra)	account	of	Yanesha	conceptions	of	
knowledge	is	largely	concordant	with	Matsigenka	peoples’	notions	as	well,	
which	means	that	they	distinguish	between	material	and	nonmaterial,	or	
spiritual,	dimensions	of	the	world.		As	among	Yanesha	people,	Matsigenka	
people	conceive	of	the	spiritual	dimension	of	the	world	as	being	accessible	
only	to	the	spiritual	part	of	the	self	that	thereby	acquires	knowledge	and	
that	subsequently	can	be	diffused	to	others.		On	the	basis	of	such	knowledge	
the	soul	gives	meaning	to	sensory	stimuli	and	through	the	rationalization	
of	experience	the	soul	is	fundamental	in	forming	individual	identity.		
	 A	 corollary	 of	 the	 awareness	 of	 self	 is	 the	 awareness	 of	 Other,	
which	 also	 is	 a	 condition	 for	 sociality.	 	Self-awareness	 is,	 accordingly,	 a	
prerequisite	for	encounters	of	significance	that	implies	an	exchange	of,	at	
least,	the	experience	of	meeting.		Any	kind	of	confrontation	with	an	Other	
will,	 moreover,	 influence	 the	 awareness	 of	 self.	 	 Thus,	 individual	 self-
identification	emerges	as	a	result	of	socializing.		The	effect	of	influences	
of	this	kind	depends	on	the	strength	of	the	self-awareness	(which	means	
that	those	in	gestation	and	those	recently	born	are	more	easily	influenced	
than	their	elders)	but	also	on	the	volition	of	self.		Self-awareness	contains	
an	element	of	“becoming-other”	to	borrow	a	concept	from	Gilles	Deleuze	
and	 Felix	 Guattari	 (1987).	 	 But,	 for	 example,	 as	 Overing	 (1985c)	 has	
shown,	socializing	can	also	entail	an	aspiration	of	“becoming-alike.”	 	 In	
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effect,	perspectivism	among	the	Matsigenka	is	not	primarily	a	question	of	
perception	but	of	sociality.
	 Self-awareness	is,	accordingly,	not	a	mere	disposition	or	perspective,	
the	 particularity	 of	 which	 is	 shared	 by	 other	 physically	 similar	 beings.	
Rather,	it	is	something	unique,	formed	by	the	specific	historical	conditions	
that	 influence	the	development	of	each	 individual’s	 soul.	 	 In	contrast	 to	
common	subjectivity,	 the	 self is	highly	personal	 and,	 as	 such,	 individual	
diversity	is	the	standard.		While	the	identity	of	subjectivity	is	given	by	the	
corporeal	form,	the	identity	of	the	soul	is	formed	in	the	betweenness	of	
social	interaction.		
NOTES
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alone	is	responsible	for	any	remaining	inadequacies.
	 1.		In	the	context	of	this	essay	I	put	the	cognizant	aspect	of	self	in	focus.		The	
physical	aspect	of	self	is	not	without	importance	and,	as	becomes	clear	below,	to	
Matsigenka	people	the	physical	and	non-physical	aspects	are	linked,	mind	does	for	
instance	rely	on	the	body	for	its	sensuous	experience	of	the	world,	as	well	as	being	
a	tool	for	communication.		However,	the	physical	aspect	of	being	is	seen,	above	all,	
as	an	envelope	of	the	cognizant	aspect,	the	shape	of	which	is	mainly	the	product	
of	the	cognizant	aspect’s	sociability.		When	I	use	the	concept	of	“self ”	here	it	is	
the	idiosyncratic	consciousness	that	emerges	and	is	formed	in	the	interaction	with	
other	similar	consciousnesses	within	specific	historic	contexts	that	is	intended.		
	 2.		Matsigenka	people	distinguish	between	two	types	of	soul:	the	bone	soul	
(itonki)	and	a	free	soul	that	 is	called	isure, which	is	the	kind	of	soul	referred	to	
here.		According	to	Baer	(1984:129)	some	Matsigenka	may	entertain	a	belief	in	a	
third	kind	of	soul,	one	he	describes	as	an	eye	soul	(ishigentiaarite).		As	far	as	I	am	
aware,	Baer	is	the	only	ethnographer	to	mention	this	third	kind	of	soul.		The	belief	
in	it	is	apparently	not	common	among	Matsigenka	people.		Among	the	Arawak	
speaking	peoples	of	the	Montaña	region,	soul	conceptions	seem	to	vary.		Beliefs	
in	multiple	souls	are	found	among	both	the	Yine	(Piro)	people	(cf.	Gow	2001:64)	
and	the	Yanesha,	among	whom	notions	of	an	eye	soul	also	have	been	reported	(cf.	
Santos-Granero	 intra).	 	Conversely,	Weiss	 (1975:427)	maintains	 that	Riverine	
Asháninka	people	only	entertain	beliefs	in	a	single	soul.
	 3.	 	For	 a	detailed	 examination	of	 the	 effects	 of	nonhuman	 influences	 that	
leave	no	physical	signs,	see	Londoño	Sulkin	(intra).
	 4.		Similar	kinds	of	baths	are	administered	as	part	of	the	mourning	process.	
In	 concordance	 with	 the	 argument	 of	 this	 essay,	 Shepard	 (2002:214)	 sees	 the	
baths	 taken	a	 few	days	 after	 a	person’s	death	as	 a	defense	against	death	 spirits	
(kamatsirini).
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	 5.		Father	García’s	rendering	of	the	narrative	structure	follows	Western	literary	
conventions.		This	means	that	certain	aspects	of	the	myth	are	lost.		For	the	present	
purpose,	this	version	of	the	myth	can	be	used,	since	it	is	the	general	content	that	
is	of	interest.		With	regard	to	content	the	version	does	not	differ	in	any	significant	
way	to	other	versions	that	I	have	heard	or	seen	(cf.	Arias	2003).
	 6.	 	García	 (1936:87)	 suggests	 that	 the	 scalding	with	 hot	water	 is	 done	 to	
take	off	the	bristles	as	is	done	with	slaughtered	pigs	before	cutting	them	up.		I	
believe	though	that	the	kind	of	scalding	referred	to	in	the	narrative	is	of	an	entirely	
different	nature,	primarily	because	 the	peccary-man	 is	not	dead	and	the	young	
man	has	obviously	no	intentions	of	butchering	him.		The	bath	referred	to	is	most	
likely	 of	 the	 kind	 that	mothers	 give	 their	 babies	 (see	 above)	 and	 for	 the	 same	
purpose,	 that	 is,	 to	 cleanse	 them	 from	nonhuman	 influence	with	 the	 effect	 of	
maintaining	or	regaining	(as	in	the	myth)	humanness.
	 7.	 	This	 is	paraphrasing	Seeger,	Da	Matta,	and	Viveiros	de	Castro	(1979),	
who	argue	that	Amazonian	sociology	could	be	seen	as	physiology.
	 8.	 	This	is	a	well	known	myth	in	the	Upper	Urubamba	area.		I	have	heard	
it	told	a	number	of	times	by	different	narrators,	with	only	minor	variations	that	
principally	are	produced	by	the	individual	narrative	style	of	the	various	performers.	
The	version	that	I	use	here	was	told	to	me	in	the	native	community	of	Koribeni	by	
Mr.	Dario	Mahuantiari.
	 9.		The	concept	of	“transdimensional	relations,”	as	used	here,	is	related	to	the	
notion	of	different	points	of	view.	 	Matsigenka	people	conceive	of	cosmos	as	a	
multiverse	with	overlapping	and	interacting	worlds,	or	dimensions.		Accordingly,	
the	 change	 of	 dimension	 does	 not	 require	 a	 physical	 dislocation,	 since	 the	
transference	between	dimensions	is	basically	achieved	through	attuning	differently	
to	the	cosmos.
	 10.		Asháninka	people	also	conceive	of	animal	sounds	as	different	languages	
(Weiss	1975:426).
	 11.		Matsigenka	people	do	not	make	a	conceptual	distinction	between	these	
two	kinds	of	bodies	and	they	talk	about	both	in	terms	of	ivatsa	(“flesh,	body”).
	 12.		The	account	that	Santos-Granero	(intra)	gives	of	the	Yanesha	peoples’	
notions	of	the	sentient	body,	and	also	to	some	extent	the	one	that	Lagrou	(intra)	
gives	of	the	Cashinahua	“thinking	body,”	agree	with	corresponding	Matsigenka	
conceptions	that	also	resemble	the	distinction	that	Piaroa	people	make	between	
a	“life	of	thought”	and	a	“life	of	the	senses,”	understood	as	constitutive	parts	of	
human	beings	(see	Overing	1988:174).
	 13.	 	 The	 condition	 that	 both	 the	 peccary	 and	 the	 oropendola	 in	 the	
myths	 discussed	here	 are	 of	 a	 distinctively	 gregarious	 nature	 is	 probably	 just	 a	
coincidence.		In	other	myths	persons	are	transformed	into	more	solitary	species	
though	transformation	always	occurs	to	enable	conviviality.
	 14.	 	Such	notions	 seem	 to	be	held	 elsewhere	 in	 the	Amazon	as	well.	 	An	
example	is	found	in	one	of	the	Cashinahua	myths	that	Lagrou	presents	(intra)	in	
which	Paketawã,	the	principal	protagonist,	transforms	into	an	Inka,	an	emblem	of	
alterity	among	Cashinahua	people,	only	through	sharing	and	pacific	coexistence.
	 15.		The	meaning	and	origin	of	this	term	has	been	interpreted	variously	by	
different	authors.		One	of	the	earliest	explanations	to	be	found	in	the	literature	
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belongs	to	Tessmann	(1930:84)	according	to	whom	it	is	derived	from	the	Quechua	
word	cholo	(with	the	derogative	meaning	of	“mestizo”).		Weiss	(1975:232)	similarly	
suggests	that	it	is	derived	from	Quechua	but	from	the	word	churi	with	the	meaning	
of	“son.”	According	to	France-Marie	Renard-Casevitz	(personal	communication,	
May	2000)	tsori	could	be	translated	as	“false”	or	“untrue.”
	 16.	 	The	 initial	 syllable,	ga-,	 is	 the	 root	of	 the	 verb	gagantsi,	 the	meaning	
of	which	covers	a	wide	semantic	field.		Two	of	the	various	potential	translations	
distinguished	by	Snell	(1998:86ff )	are	“to	catch,	grab”	and	“to	marry,”	but,	at	least	
in	the	Upper	Urubamba	area,	it	is	also	used	(perhaps	as	an	extension)	as	“to	have	
sex”	and	“to	rape.”
	 17.	 	 See	 also	 Belaúnde	 (intra)	 on	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 stench	 of	 blood	 on	
transdimensional	 relations	 and	 Lagrou	 (intra)	 on	 sexual	 odors	 as	 negatively	
affecting	relations	to	game	and	fish.
	 18.		Notions	of	that	kind	of	specter	are	also	entertained	by	Matsigenka	people	
who	denote	it	as	kamatsiri.
	 19.		In	some	Germanic	languages	there	seem	to	be	concepts	that	are	similar	
to	the	Latin	counterpart.		In,	for	instance,	Swedish	there	is	a	word	bildning	(which	
seems	 to	 be	 related	 etymologically	 to	 the	English	 concept	 of	 “building,”	 both	
as	 a	noun	 and	 as	 a	 verb)	 that	 besides	“formation”	 and	“structure”	 also	 signifies	
“education,	good	breeding,	refinement	and	training.”
	 20.	 	 This	 understanding	 seems	 to	 closely	 resemble	 Piaroa	 conceptions,	
as	described	by	Overing,	who	notes	 that	 a	“	…	verb	 that	designates	 existence,	
a’kwarü,	is	derived	from	the	noun	ta’kwarü	(“the	life	of	thought”)	…		As	human	or	
as	god,	one	can	say	tü akwarus	(“I	live,	I	exist,	I	am”)	…	To	have	ta’kwarü	…	entails	
the	acquisition	and	learning	of	both	cultural	capabilities	…	and	responsibility,	or	
consciousness”	(1988:175).
	 21.		Among	Matsigenka	people	at	least	two	kinds	of	narrative	genres	can	be	
discerned.		Up	until	now	this	article	has	made	use	of	myths	while	the	story	to	be	
presented	below	belongs	to	the	genre	that	I	provisionally	have	called	“biographical”	
(Rosengren,	 2003b)	 as	 it	 allegedly	 deals	 with	 accounts	 of	 historical	 persons.	
Biographical	 narratives	 differ	 from	myths	 in	 that	 the	 events	 accounted	 for	 are	
supposed	to	have	taken	place	in	a	past	that	is	closer	in	time	to	the	present	than	the	
undefined	or	distant	past	of	mythic	accounts.		Events	described	in	biographical	
narratives	are	usually	situated	in	time	no	more	distant	than	the	time	of	the	rubber	
boom	but	no	closer	 than	 the	childhood	 time	of	 the	eldest	people	 living	 in	 the	
neighborhood.	 	A	crucial	characteristic	of	 these	kinds	of	 stories	 is,	accordingly,	
that	they	are	presented	as	reminiscences	of	actual	events	in	which	known	people,	
who	are	now	dead,	took	part.		The	narrator,	which	again	is	Dario	Mahuantiari,	
presents	the	principal	protagonist	as	his	maternal	grandfather.
	 22.	 	 In	 Asháninka	 nošire	 means	 both	 “my	 soul”	 and	 “my	 heart”	 (Weiss	
1975:426f ).
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